Using Conflicting Authorities?!: Abelard's Method, Compared to Other Scholastic Methods

Principles for All Retrievalists, Part 3

Here in this third part of our series, Principles for All Retrievalists, we continue to introduce Abelard’s Sic et non, before turning to its prologue and Abelard’s program for actually reconciling conflicting authorities.

In short, throughout the main body of Sic et non, Abelard uses conflicting authorities as a method for determining two contradictions at once, rather than the lightweight (if you will) method of determining contradictions one by one. Comparing this to other scholastic methods is helpful, as is noting Abelard’s background in the lectio-quaestio-disputatio model. Abelard lived in an age of shifting educational forms, and was an innovator in new ones. Yet from the perspective of later scholastics, his method is not startling or even really very remarkable.

But that doesn’t mean his method is easy!

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What is Abelard’s means or method throughout Sic et non?

Initially, we can call Abelard’s means or method proceeding through opposite authorities. (In our next post, we will speak of his method of dubitatio.)

In order to understand this well, it is helpful to recall the developing scholastic methods for determining questions/contradictions, as well as the earlier method which is their point of departure.

Scholastic Methods: Some Basics

Most familiar of course are the standard and basic methods for determining questions/contradictions, namely proceeding through authorities (proceditur per auctoritatem) and proceeding through rationes (per rationem). In simple terms, the master argues one part of a contradiction by deploying authorities (very roughly, listing prooftexts), or by giving arguments (rationes) in its favor. He is handling one contradiction and uses authorities/rationes which bear upon also one part of the same.

This is quickly extended to proceeding pro et contra, e.g., through opposite rationes. The master still handles one contradiction, but now he identifies the different arguments (rationes) for both parts, before determining which part is true (solutio; determinatio), and thereafter responding to the arguments for the false part.

Finally, eventually there is the standardized quaestio form, which has five parts, but is proceeding through rationes and authorities opposed to each other. Facing a certain question (dubitabilis propositio), the master now first gives the arguments for one part, namely which he holds as false: thus, objections. He then deploys (usually) authorities for the other part, which he holds as true: sed contra. Finally, he gives his own argument(s) for the same (respondeo), before in the end handling the objections (solutiones).

But before all this, there was also the earlier lectio-quaestio-disputatio process, from which the above (and other) developing scholastic method are all breaking free. This process is entirely tied to texts. Briefly, the scholastic student will read the text (lectio), apprehending its sense (intellectus). Yet throughout the course of his reading, the student at different points will encounter a “problem passage”: viz., one whose sense having been determined, either (1) conflicts with an authority which the student recalls, and/or (2) forms together with another proposition (ratio), which the student also holds as true, an apparent contradiction. Either of these makes doubt or quaestio (usually, quomodo sit); and handling this situation (e.g., the aporia, viz., how are both these true?) is called disputatio. This all once again is tied to texts. Yet as scholasticism develops, masters (and even students) more and more handle questions/contradictions “purely” or in isolation from the long course of reading, thereby requiring new methods (e.g., the three above noted).

Abelard as a Transition Figure

Abelard in many modes is a transition figure, one who stands halfway between the “pure” lectio-quaestio-disputatio process, and the “pure” questions/contradictions methods found in high(er) scholasticism. Thus on the one hand, like all these later methods, Abelard directly handles questions/contradictions, rather than engages in the long course of reading. And like some of these methods, he uses authorities to determine such. But and unique to himself, Abelard proceeds through opposite authorities. His method has the same overall form as the pro et contra one, albeit the latter uses instead opposite rationes. However, Abelard’s method is complexified given the unique nature of authorities by contrast to arguments: accordingly, in each chapter Abelard is either (1) giving authorities for both parts of one contradiction (thus the same as the pro et contra); or and more usually (2) giving authorities for two parts of two different contradictions (on this, more in a moment). This master, genius logician as he was, decides to handle not just both parts of one contradiction, but also different parts of two contradictions at once.

Yet on the other hand, Abelard is still very much tied to texts and following the (then) standard lectio-quaestio-disputatio method, only now with two adjustments. First, Abelard has collected all the would-be “problem passages” which the student would have encountered throughout lectio: his Sic et non includes the “diverse sayings,” he says, “which stick out in our memory because they induce some questio.” Notably, Abelard has avoided the longer course of lectio, and gathered all the “problem passages” together at once. Second, Abelard has helpfully supplied the student all the various authority(s) which he ought to recall as conflicting with the “problem passages,” prompting quaestio and ultimately disputatio. Again in the normal course of lectio, after having determined the sense of one authority, that authority only becomes a “problem” when another one is recalled and insofar as such seems to conflict with it. Abelard thus has merely given two shortcuts to the lectio-quaestio-disputatio process which his teachers and fellow masters used–in line with the gradual move away from pure engagement with texts and the intensified focus upon questions/contradictions alone, which is a hallmark of developing scholasticism.

Accordingly, Abelard’s method is a transitional method moving away from lectio-quaestio-disputatio, and toward (ultimately) the standardized quaestio form of high scholasticism. It was startling for his time (at least for Bernard, not to mention others); but his method is not striking from the perspective of later scholastics. Indeed, Abelard in part heads up this this burgeoning scholasticism which handles larger and larger quantities of patristic authorities, as well as produces more and more universal systems, achieving greater universality as to truth. Abelard uses yes roughly 2000 authorities, but this pales in comparison to how many Lombard would use. Abelard levels a barrage of 158 apparent contradictions (we include contraries for ease), meaning there are (at most) 316 contradictions total to determine; but how could one compare this to the number of contradictions faced by the later Thomas?

Greater Complexity: Two Contradictions, Not Just One

All this said, however, Abelard’s method is certainly more complex (as we already alluded) by comparison to e.g., Lombard’s–both because the uniqueness of authorities versus rationes, and the uniqueness of using opposite authorities (as Abelard), versus (for lack of better terms) straightforward ones (as Lombard, usually). This merits further remark.

As is well known, Lombard almost exclusively proceeds through authorities straightforwardly (again, for lack of better terms). That is, he deploys authorities in support of the proposition which he holds, e.g., the affirmative of the contradiction. After proving (usually through rationes) e.g., the affirmative, much more rarely does Lombard alert to another authority which seems to support the negative. Notably, in these cases Lombard has not leveled conflicting authorities (although they do conflict!), but rather an additional authority seemingly in favor of the negative and thus opposed to the affirmative. Still, in these cases, bachelor commentators engage in similar work as Abelard’s students would have (particularly using Abelard’s first solution, namely determining the actual intellectus, sense of the authority).

What is more, scholastics beyond Lombard very often handle difficult authorities which seem to support e.g., a middle term concluding (via syllogism) the opposite proposition: e.g., everything which has a body part is a body; God, this authority from holy Scripture says, has a body part (e.g., a hand); ergo. Thus, most regularly do authorities occur in both the pro and contra sections of the pro et contra form (which, recall, proceeds through opposed rationes); and they also frequently occur in the objections section of the quaestio form. Again in these cases, the master will engage in similar work as Abelard’s students.

In light of this, scholastics are always dealing with “problematic” authorities–here, defined as those which either (1) prove/conclude to the position opposite the sentence of the master, and/or (2) conflict with another authority. Nonetheless regardless, authorities usually are in support of the one proposition, the true part, the master’s sentence. (A sign of this is the use of authorities as the sed contra of the quaestio form.) As a consequence, a superficial reading might suggest that whereas for other scholastics authorities are (almost) always good things in favor of the truth, for Abelard they are annoyances to be stomached solved and inferior to the logician’s rationes. Such a reading would be however a major misunderstanding–likely of both how authorities versus rationes function, as well as how authorities are being used by Abelard. True, he does not proceed straightforwardly, but it is actually best to consider him as also fundamentally proceeding through authorities which support true propositions.

Consider this carefully. Sidelining the issue of conflict, Abelard usually is deploying two authorities (or sets of authorities) in favor of the two true parts of two neighboring contradictions. (Something similar could be said in the case of contraries). Whereas in Lombard only one contradiction is in play at a time, in Abelard you usually face two. Lombard spread things out and issues one authority for one contradiction in support of its true part; Abelard closes things together and issues two authorities for two contradiction in support of their true parts. Notably, often but not always do the two true parts have the same logical form except for having opposite qualities–that is to say, they together have the form of a contradiction: these two parts that God is and is not wise, although they have the form of a contradiction, are in fact the true affirmative and negative parts of two contradictions. The good logician knows that looks can be deceiving (logical forms obscure intellectual content), and has different modes of addressing this issue.

To be sure, Abelard sometimes (but rather rarely) is deploying two authorities, where each is in favor of either part of one and the same contradiction. Importantly, his solution in such cases (we will slightly revise this later) is not just “choose between the authorities,” but rather enlist as many other authorities as possible and hold whichever part has better ones (whereupon one then chooses between the original authorities). Remarkably, this corresponds exactly to Lombard’s also rarer treatment of authorities which oppose the true part–if one cannot handle the issue through some explanation (ratio), e.g., by apprehending the sense of the authority.

In light of all this, Abelard’s method yes is more complex (and one might say more difficult on the front end), but ultimately he same overall treatment of authorities vis-a-vis questions/contradictions. And on this his method, we can conclude our section with the best and worst case scenario faced in his chapters.

Beginning with the worst case scenario, one must determine the (one!) contradiction, doing so through other authorities, and then (de facto) choosing between the original authorities which one has come to know do actually support contrary opinions. Admittedly, I have not worked through minutely every chapter in the Sic et non, but this is a rare circumstance.

The best case scenario, and which is the most frequent circumstance, is that one gets to determine two neighboring contradictions, and/or achieve two neighboring truths (in the case of contraries): as a result, one achieves at once a larger view of the whole picture, than one would have from determining only one contradiction. Abelard’s very first chapter is a good example: “That faith is not to be furnished with human rationes, and the contrary [viz., that it is to be].” The entire relationship of auctoritates and rationes both to faith is complex, and simplistic answers are liable to misunderstand the whole. Handling the question how rationes do and do not bear upon faith (quomodo sit quod sic et non), rather than the question whether rationes in a certain sense do or do not do so (utrum sit vel non), can be a better approach.