Bible Crisis?: How Maimonides Will Save Your Faith

You can be an Aristotelian *and* keep holy Scripture

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People often come to me after a solid course in Aristotle or a study in Thomist theology, now troubled regarding holy Scripture.

I am always anxious to affirm their troubles. An Aristotelian is rightly bothered when he reads holy Scripture. His eyes are not deceiving him. He struggles for good reason. And someone who holds Thomist theology, or just (can I say) traditional theology, is likewise “caught out” for understandable reasons. He is not tilting at windmills, but actually confronting real and serious and many problems in comparing what he holds to be true, to what he sees on the Sacred Page.

After I affirm these troubles, I then hand out Maimonides and his Guide for the Perplexed–as Maimonides’s stated goal for his famous work is “to free that one fine mind from the mire and guide him from perplexity to inner peace and perfection” (pg. 16). In other words, the point of the Guide (one of my all-time favorite texts) is to do just that: to guide or lead you from your current state, namely of perplexity, unto a different and better state, namely of intellectual peace. Maimonides wants to resolve the war in your mind between Aristotle and holy Scripture. He wants to save your faith when you’re in the grip of this conflict. He wants to solve your problems. Keep you from deconverting.

What then is Maimonides’s solution, the Maimonidean magic? Well, you always have to understand the problem clearly before you start handling its solution(s); so let’s begin with two prior questions: (1) what really is the nature of being perplexed–the essence of your troubled feelings?; and (2) what causes this, or why do you feel that way?

What Is Being Perplexed?

So what then is being perplexed? Aristotle would call this experiencing aporia; Latin scholastics received this in translation as having dubitatio. Hence the Latin translation of Maimonides’s Guide: Dux neutrorum vel dubiorum, “Guide for Those Undecided,” namely between two things, “or Doubtful,” namely hesitating or caught between two opinions. When Paul says in Phil. 1:23 that he is “hard pressed between the two,” having the desire to depart and be with Christ, and the desire to remain and be with the church–he is speaking of the volitional equivalent to perplexity, which is an intellectual state. The volitional equivalent is being caught between two competing goods and unable to choose; the intellectual is being caught between two propositions and unable to move forward. Aristotle speaks of this as a knot or intellectual cords wrapped around the feet, whereupon one can no longer make progress in knowledge. We would say colloquially today that it is “being caught out” intellectual speaking.

Importantly, every experience of aporia arises from considering two sayings which seem to be opposed–and the very appearance of opposition renders one “tied up” intellectually speaking. Given that there are two and only two sorts of opposition (as Aristotle says), namely opposition of contradiction and that of two contraries, the pair of sayings will have the form either of a contradiction, e.g., that Socrates is and is not wise; or affirmation of two contraries, e.g., that Socrates is healthy and sick. Someone who confronts pairs of sayings having either of these forms and who considers them intellectually is experiencing perplexity.

We must clarify one more issue involving perplexity: being perplexed can involve either our second act of intellect judgment, or our first act understanding. There is perplexity which struggles between two sayings as to which is true and which is false, given that they are contradictory and tertium non datur. In this case, the perplexity calls for decision or intellectual choice between the sayings, assenting to one only as true and dissenting from the other as false. But on the other hand, there is perplexity which does not struggle as to which saying is true, but accepting both as true struggles to understand how this is, given the seeming contradiction. Whereas the former perplexity called for decision, this perplexity calls for explanation. The question therefore is never Whether something is or is not, or which saying is true; but only How are both said and/or the case. Importantly, the perplexity which we are speaking about here is only of the latter sort.

What Is Causing This Perplexity? Aristotle *and* Holy Scripture

So in a word, being perplexed is the intellectual state which experiences two contradictory/contrary sayings, but doesn’t know how they hold together. This prompts the further question: What is the cause of such an intellectual state, in our current case(s)?; or otherwise said, What populates all the contradictions/contraries and thus makes us troubled? Answering this question is straightforward: there are two sources which we are dealing with, namely Aristotle and holy Scripture.

On the one hand, is what could be called natural theology or philosophy. The first source is all the propositions of the Aristotelian system which are held by any Aristotelian as true. On the other hand, is the concrete text of holy Scripture (in Maimonides’s case, the Jewish sacred writings or our Old Testament). The second source is therefore all the various scriptural sayings.

Simply speaking, each contradiction (or two contraries) is made from one proposition from Aristotle, and one saying from holy Scripture. As these are combined in pairs, our perplexity is induced, and we question quomodo sit, how do both these hold together? (As an aside, Anselm is doing precisely this throughout Pros cc 6ff—just to give an alternate example.) Of course, the oppositions between Aristotle and holy Scripture are as manifest as they are numerous. Anyone could supply a large collection of trouble-makers or puzzlers and arrange it in order to underline the conflict: holy Scripture here says yes, but Aristotle there says no; holy Scripture says hot, Aristotle cold. Maimonides himself in his Guide is rather ambitious and wants to resolve almost all our perplexities, and thus tries to form (adequately) all the possible oppositions (contradictions and contraries) which one can make from combining Aristotle and holy Scripture.

Some simple examples. You ought to be perplexed about how holy Scripture says that God is seen, but Aristotle says he is invisible. And how Scripture says that God himself sees, whereas Aristotle that he has no body (Guide 1, 4). You ought to be perplexed about how Scripture reads that God is in various places (1, 8), on a throne (1, 9), filling the earth (1, 19), and so on, whereas–as every Aristotelian knows–God is illocal. And again, you ought to be perplexed about how then does God descend and ascend, moving from place to place, if he is altogether immobile (1, 10). And how does he sit (1, 11), arise (1, 12), and finally stand (1, 13), all various bodily postures, when God alone is spirit. And how is God merciful, angered, etc., when utterly impassible (1, 36).

And there are much harder problems than these. For example, you ought to be very very perplexed indeed about how holy Scripture even says that God has knowledge, or love, and how it ascribes him many other attributes, when as every Aristotelian knows God is altogether simple. You should be disturbed about how Moses delivered us the thirteen Middot Rachamim (Exodus 34:6–7), when Ibn Sina shows in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics that God can have no positive attributes at all.

Ramping Up the Problems

So this is the nature of perplexity, and also its underlying cause. However, we ought to expand things even a bit further here, to make sure we really understand and grasp the seriousness of all is involved–

For Maimonides, someone experiencing the perplexity at hand has, first of all, matured philosophically. Not only does he hold all the propositions of the Aristotelian system, but he also apprehends their intellectual content: he understands the concepts or definitions involved; he knows the judgments which such propositions signify; he has scientia or scientific certainty about the truth in these judgments; he knows what are more principle judgments, and what they “contain” as further conclusions; etc. In perhaps the simplest of terms, he is well aware about what all the Aristotelian propositions mean, he is certain that they are true and the opposite propositions false; and he sees all the ground which these propositions virtually cover: e.g., he easily sees that God being incorporeal entails also that he does not have a hand; that God being impassible entails that he has no anger; etc.

But more, someone experiencing this perplexity is, second of all, also a fair reader of holy Scripture and is indeed scripturally lettered. He knows what holy Scripture says, and has done the hard work of deriving the ad litteram sense–“the surface sense of certain biblical expressions,” Maimonides flags (pg. 6). He therefore immediately sees that the ad litteram sense, in the case of so many scriptural sayings, just is the other and false part of the contradictions whose opposites he holds as true on philosophical grounds. That is to say, these form real contradictions, and thus only one can be true and the other false, either the Aristotelian proposition or this ad litteram sense. But again, because he has so matured philosophically and has scientia about the Aristotelian propositions, he is nowise inclined to hold the ad litteram sense as true: he sticks to his guns and holds the philosophical proposition as true, and thus this ad litteram sense as false. Importantly, no matter what happens, there is not going to be any “rejiggering” which occurs along this Aristotelian front—only along the scriptural one.

But all this makes him perplexed: he does not know what to do in this situation, how to hold together the philosophical proposition and the scriptural saying. And not only in this situation (viz., this one contradiction), but in all the other situations which he begins to encounter as he reads holy Scripture further and compares it to Aristotle. In fact, for Maimonides envisioning the audience of his Guide, the person is extremely perplexed, for he has experienced so very many real contradictions and has sat with them for such a length of time, that he now is entirely tied up in his head.

Complex Problems, Complex Solution(s)

Complex problems require complex solutions. And the seeming contradictions formed from combining Aristotelian propositions and scriptural sayings are indeed complex problems–but importantly, not all the same sort of problem. Accordingly, Maimonides guides one from being perplexed to having intellectual peace by way of many paths.

The Easy Paths

Some paths are easy. For example, Maimonides will take many chapters early on in the Guide to remind you of equivocal senses of names, and names signifying metaphorically. Thus, when holy Scripture says that someone sees God (1, 4), the ad litteram sense which uses the primary definition of the name sees, viz., the act of the eye, is indeed the opposite of the philosophical proposition God being invisible. However, remember that the primary definition is often not the only one; this name also has a secondary definition, viz., the act of the intellect. Accordingly, when holy Scripture says that someone sees God, one ought not to intelligere secundum litteram, understand reality according to the initial ad litteram sense (for such is false); but rather understand that someone knows some truth about God.

Equivocal senses abound throughout the Jewish scriptures; and learning all the different equivocal senses of Hebrew names is essential for interpreting such scriptures. But nonetheless, the process–as just illustrated–is quite straightforward.

So also is the process involving metaphorical signification. For example, when holy Scripture says that God is a rock, the ad litteram sense would understand this name rock as signifying properly–and run smack against God being incorporeal (inter multa alia). But names also signify metaphorically, the speaker working by way of an image and, ultimately, an analogy of proportionality. Thus, although God being a rock was said, only e.g., that he supports us is to be understood. The prophet only had the latter in mind, but adverted to the similarity in or parallel between the relationships of God and the world, and a rock and a house, and therefore he said that God is a rock. The name rock signifies supports, signifying metaphorically.

Before anyone sneers and says “well this is obvious,” let me protest and say that yes it is obvious, but sometimes people miss very obvious things; and this is merely an example to learn the pattern for the solution to situations like this. There are many more and much less obvious situations where that pattern applies. As for example, Thomas reminds that certain Jewish theologians forgot this when it came to all the scriptural sayings that God is impassioned: e.g., that he is angered; that he is saddened; etc. Although these are identical to God being a rock or having a hand, nonetheless when they saw these sayings in holy Scripture, the Jewish theologians understood “according to propriety,” i.e., they understood according to the ad litteram sense, “not distinguishing what in the holy Scriptures is said properly, and what metaphorically” (SCG I c 91). As a result, they gravely erred. And most certainly there are many people today who share the same error and for the same reason.

Still, these paths are easy: “there’s a different definition,” and “it’s just a metaphor” are the solutions. Other paths, as it turns out, are harder.

The Harder Paths

We already alluded to these harder paths above: they involve the rather many scriptural sayings that God is wise, is good, etc. (traditional examples), or e.g., Moses’s thirteen Middot Rachamim, the “thirteen attributes of mercy” found in Exodus 34:6–7.

Recall that when I say that Socrates is wise, the name signifies a certain quality, namely wisdom, which inheres in Socrates’s substance; when I say that a woman is merciful, this name again signifies a certain quality mercy inhering in her substance. Aristotle lays this out in Categories, speaking of the saying “predicating quality”; and Maimonides calls this propositions affirming names from quality (1, 53).

Now all these names are being usurped into divinis and said of God throughout holy Scripture. Moreover, holy Scripture treats these sayings very differently from the above examples, that someone sees God, that God is a rock, etc. Although a careful reader of the latter two can likely conclude that an equivocal sense and metaphorical signification is in play, this is not so much the case for our current examples. Holy Scripture treats God being wise, him being merciful, etc. properly and formally: rather remarkable, if you ask me.

Nonetheless, according to Aristotle–according to all who are good theologians–God has no qualities, but is altogether simple. Therefore, these scriptural sayings all seem contradictory to this judgment; and certainly, the ad litteram sense of such sayings is contradictory to this position. This then is a much harder problem than the ones considered above–and, we remind, it is pressing on the very sayings which almost everyone who reads holy Scripture “takes to the bank” and stakes their life upon. This will make things rather sticky.

In the course of about ten chapters (cc 50–60), Maimonides will lay out the essential steps of the difficult, and somewhat dangerous, path here, moving one from the state of perplexity, to the state of peace. But most important among all these essential steps are a couple items.

First, Maimonides reminds (1, 53) that not only are there sayings which affirm names from quality, but there are also ones which affirm names from action, i.e., work. (This is the same as extrinsic denomination of an agent from its pati.) The easiest way to apprehend this difference in English is considering the saying that someone is kind. On the one hand, sometimes this predicates quality and signifies kindness in the heart of someone; but other times, it predicates action/work and signifies the kindness outside someone but which arose from him: e.g., when someone does me a service and I say that he is kind, this does not posit kindness in his heart, but merely identifies him as the one who did me the kindness (the service). Although we likely have fewer examples of this in English, Maimonides will flag that this is frequent in Semitic languages and obviously occurs all throughout the Jewish sacred writings: e.g., someone who does a chesed, is said chasid–just like in English, when someone is said just merely when something obliged has been done by him.

Second, Maimonides also reminds us of our two intellectual resources, for lack of better terms, both of which are in line with God being simple. The first is “causal” affirmative judgments–which in fact pair up with the propositions affirming names from work just noted: e.g., there is order in the created world and it came from God; there is salvation from trouble and it came from God; etc. Beyond this, there are also negative judgments–like God not being foolish; not being evil; etc. Both these sorts of judgments are true, and do not run afoul of God being absolutely simple: the one merely removes something from God, and the other just posits a relation in us, as Thomas himself says (ST I q 13 a 2 resp).

Accordingly, Maimonides will use either of these sorts of judgments as the interpretations of the problematic sayings. On the one hand, when we read that God is wise, we understand only that he is not foolish; when we read that he is good, we understand only not evil. This interpretation, called the negative interpretation, pertains to all the sayings when the prophet is speaking of God himself (deus secundum se), never saying what God is, but only what is not in the case of him–and this only, regardless of whether the quality of the saying is negative or affirmative: that God is not foolish and that he is wise involve one and the same judgment, which divides our foolishness from God.

What about when the prophet is speaking of God and us (deus pro nobis), as in e.g., Moses’s thirteen Middot? Here, we use the “causal” interpretation: when we read that God is merciful, this is a saying affirming a name from work–whereupon we understand only that our salvation is of the Lord. Once again, we must not confuse this and imagine that it is a saying affirming a name from quality–whereupon we would understand that God is merciful. Such an understanding is false to fact, and one must become disabused of it. Do note that sometimes the concrete saying can be interpreted in either way, either negatively or causally: when we read that God is wise, we could also understand that the order among us creatures is from God. But once again, these sayings are the same as the English saying that someone is kind, i.e., the one who did us a kindness.

These are the basic steps along the harder path(s) which handle these scriptural sayings–in fact, the vast majority of scriptural sayings involving God. Contrary to all appearances, they are all either “secret” negations or humble reflections upon created states of affairs, states of affairs which did not arise from any creaturely agent: on the one hand, creaturely commentary, and on the other, what is not in the case of God.

A Final Twist

There is one more final twist—sure to make many uncomfortable. But it really is the last little bit required to solve someone’s perplexity. It involves explaining, if reality is so otherwise, and if the ad litteram sense in all these cases is false, then why did holy Scripture say all this at all? Why instead of saying that God supports, did it say that he is a rock? And why instead of saying that he is not cruel, did it say that he is merciful?; or instead of saying that our sin will be punished, did it say that he is angered?

Not only does Maimonides teach you how to interpret, but he also teaches you how to rationalize the original ad litteram sense which was the source of all the trouble in the first place. Part of his explanation is again fairly easy–and unsurprisingly, it corresponds to the easier problems noted above. The prophet said that God is a rock, because through images are how most people think. He said that God has a hand, because most people work with their hands. In other words, the use of metaphor in holy Scripture is due to the fact that our knowledge of anything is taken from our sense data, and this rationalizes the use of these sayings in the mouths of the prophets. Maimonides will take care however to also expand this and explain why the prophets use only certain material for their metaphors, and never use other material: they say that God has a hand, an arm, but never a shoulder; that he hears, sees, but never tastes. All this, when fully expanded, ought to entirely resolve one’s perplexity given these sayings–and that is Maimonides’s goal.

The other part of his explanation, however, involves the more difficult sayings noted above, viz., that God is wise, that he is good, that he is merciful, that he is angered, etc., for all of which the negative and “causal” interpretations are used. The rationalization of actually saying these sayings, however, is much more difficult, and even dangerous. In true Maimonidean fashion, I cannot speak of it here. I can only hint that it might involve his seventh cause of contradiction (noted in his introduction), and refer the careful and sober reader to e.g., Guide 3, 28, where Maimonides might speak to the issue of why say that God is merciful, when he is not; why that he is angered, when he is not–and why contrast these with more obvious metaphorical sayings like God being a rock or having a hand, and treat them as proper and formal sayings.