What exactly is the problem behind understanding something like wisdom to be a pure perfection, i.e. a perfection which in its very definition is indifferent to being received into potency or not? If that's the case for wisdom/understanding, life and esse, then there will be no problem in literally predicating wisdom of God so one need not trivialize the words of Scripture.
If one wishes to keep a respect of God in which He refuses absolutely all literal predication, then one may distinguish between the superessentiality of God and the superessential perfection of God. The former refuses the literal predication of even pure perfections and is the way in which God is too transcendent to even be understood as causal. The latter accepts them due to being the causal source of all perfections by way of participation.
There is no problem in doing so; that's Thomas's position (among many others), and likewise my own.
It's just not Maimonides's position. Maimonides doesn't understand wisdom as abstracted from quality, and this philosophical insufficiency bars him from saying it properly/formally of God. He therefore must interpret holy Scripture in line with what he thinks are possibly true judgments.
no worries. I do hold that Maimonides is often right on the semantic force of certain biblical sayings, e.g., as being only negative: when is said that although the gods are cruel, God is love, then the force of the latter is just negative. But that doesn't mean that one cannot found such sayings on affirmative judgments involving simple perfections. It is only that Maimonides lacks said judgments that his system, as a whole, is so "agnostic" (to speak with Lagrange). But again, that's a philosophical insufficiency which plenty of theologians throughout history shared, although it seems less so in Latin tradition.
read carefully. Within the saying "although the gods are cruel, God is love," the semantic force of the latter half need only be negative. Love (obviously depending on how you define it, but...) is a simple perfection, and so one can compose the whole of it to God in intellectual judgment, rendering a subsequent proposition proper-formal.
In that way, one keeps the Aristotelian principle of understanding the First Principle to formally contain wisdom, while also appreciating 'Neo-'Platonic critiques of the First Principle needing to transcend even formally contained pure perfections in some sense.
What exactly is the problem behind understanding something like wisdom to be a pure perfection, i.e. a perfection which in its very definition is indifferent to being received into potency or not? If that's the case for wisdom/understanding, life and esse, then there will be no problem in literally predicating wisdom of God so one need not trivialize the words of Scripture.
If one wishes to keep a respect of God in which He refuses absolutely all literal predication, then one may distinguish between the superessentiality of God and the superessential perfection of God. The former refuses the literal predication of even pure perfections and is the way in which God is too transcendent to even be understood as causal. The latter accepts them due to being the causal source of all perfections by way of participation.
There is no problem in doing so; that's Thomas's position (among many others), and likewise my own.
It's just not Maimonides's position. Maimonides doesn't understand wisdom as abstracted from quality, and this philosophical insufficiency bars him from saying it properly/formally of God. He therefore must interpret holy Scripture in line with what he thinks are possibly true judgments.
Sorry, I was under the impression that you supported Maimonides' on this.
no worries. I do hold that Maimonides is often right on the semantic force of certain biblical sayings, e.g., as being only negative: when is said that although the gods are cruel, God is love, then the force of the latter is just negative. But that doesn't mean that one cannot found such sayings on affirmative judgments involving simple perfections. It is only that Maimonides lacks said judgments that his system, as a whole, is so "agnostic" (to speak with Lagrange). But again, that's a philosophical insufficiency which plenty of theologians throughout history shared, although it seems less so in Latin tradition.
The force of that "God is love" is purely negative? Love isn't a pure perfection?
read carefully. Within the saying "although the gods are cruel, God is love," the semantic force of the latter half need only be negative. Love (obviously depending on how you define it, but...) is a simple perfection, and so one can compose the whole of it to God in intellectual judgment, rendering a subsequent proposition proper-formal.
Ah, apologies. I suppose it need only be negative to be technically correct, but I would be personally dissatisfied with such a nominalism.
In that way, one keeps the Aristotelian principle of understanding the First Principle to formally contain wisdom, while also appreciating 'Neo-'Platonic critiques of the First Principle needing to transcend even formally contained pure perfections in some sense.