Introducing Abelard's Sic et Non
The Rather Vanilla Peter Abelard
In this second post of our series, Principles for All Retrievalists, we are introducing Abelard’s Sic et non. One of the fundamental lessons to learn from Abelard for reading/retrieving the fathers, is how to harvest the logical content from their natural-language sentences.
From the perspective of scholastics, one’s duty is to deal primarily with intellectual judgments, wherein is truth/falsity most properly speaking, and secondarily with logical propositions which reflect those judgments as one-to-one as possible. Although certainly technical and careful writings, the patristic corpus in the main is comprised of natural-language sentences, which means that (1) apprehending the father’s intellectual judgment and (2) converting his saying into a logical proposition is very difficult.
Abelard wants to teach you how to do this; his text thus bears basic characteristics of logic, and (as we will see in our next post) employs a technical method of teaching via inducing dubitatio.
Introduction
We want to introduce Abelard’s Sic et non as a whole.
Its chapter titles are likely the work’s most famous feature (and also whence the title of the work arises), namely sic et non, often translated yes and no. Abelard’s device here–trivially, highlighting contradiction–has awarded him (both then and now) accusations of radicality: e.g., of religious skepticism, encouraging a “method of doubt”; or of rationalism, undermining ecclesial authority and founding faith upon reason alone. It likewise has earned him charges of immorality: of pridefulness as a logician, and above all of temerity, exposing the nakedness of Noah rather than covering it.
However, these charges all fail to find grounds in Abelard’s actual text; and what is more, they also manifest basic inability to read it. We will respond to the charge of immorality (and particularly temerity) later; for now, we will argue that accusations of radicality have failed to apprehend the text’s logical character, as well as understand Abelard’s method of inducing dubitatio, or as Aristotle would say, causing an aporia.
We can handle both these points by considering Abelard’s conclusion to his prologue, where he properly introduces his Sic et non. (The remaining prologue we will handle later). “These preliminaries in hand,” he begins that conclusion,
“it pleased us (as we proposed) to collect from the holy fathers diverse sayings which stick out in our memory because they induce some question from the dissonance which they seem to have–sayings which thus provoke tender readers for that supreme task of inquiring about truth, and render them sharper from such inquiry. Indeed, the very first key of wisdom is defined as constant or frequent interrogation. Yes, that philosopher most insightful of all, Aristotle himself (see his category relation) exhorted the studious to seize such interrogation with his whole heart: ‘Perhaps it is difficult to declare confidently about realities of this sort–unless they have been often handled. But doubting about each individually will not be useless.’ By doubting yes we come to inquiring; and by inquiring we perceive truth. Accordingly, even Truth itself says ‘seek and you will find; knock and it will open to you.’ He even instructs us morally with his own example, for at twelve years of age he willed to be found in the midst of the learned, sitting and interrogating. He first exhibited to us the form of a disciple through his interrogation, and only then that of a master through his preaching–despite the fact that he himself is the very full and perfect wisdom of God.”1
Let us consider this quotation carefully, and here in this post, just the opening line.
The Subject Matter, and Logical Character of Abelard’s Work
At the very beginning of the quotation, Abelard identifies the subject matter of his Sic et non, which will also alert us to the logical character of his work. That subject matter is sensibly adverse sayings uttered by the fathers.
First, these sayings are from the fathers especially, and were gathered in the course of Abelard’s own reading throughout the massive corpus of patristic writings. Abelard will however sometimes use sayings from holy Scripture, and thus also speaks more broadly of saints, thus including prophets and apostles.
Second, these are patristic sayings (dicta), which we will often call propositions. However, note that usually Abelard’s quotations throughout are just natural-language sentences, as we would call them today, by contrast to the logical propositions which scholastics wield. One major lesson which Abelard will teach throughout his work, is how to harvest the intellectual or “logical content” from these natural-language sayings, so that one learns how to convert such into logical propositions which better reflect the intellectual judgment involved. One important goal here is obviously making these patristic sayings suitable for syllogism; but even before that, it is apprehending their intellectus (or sensus), i.e., their intellectual judgments from these colloquial sayings.
Third, although these sayings/propositions do signify something in the father’s intellect (as do all propositions), we should note that these sayings are often not sententiae. Here we must contrast with what an apparently later editor claimed, introducing Abelard’s text: “Here begin various sententiae gathered from divine writings, which seem contrary; of course, from this contrariety this compilation of sentences is called: SIC ET NON.” In truth, from the contrariety the work is called Sic et non; but the sayings throughout are not all sententiae, i.e., propositions which the fathers firmly hold as true. This contrasts with other collections of authorities like Lombard’s, which (most all) were sententiae. As Abelard is in fact anxious to teach us, many of his included sayings are e.g., opinions (roughly, loosely-held propositions), or even opinions held by others and only reported by the father. This clarification will prove quite important later.
Fourth, these sayings/propositions are not merely diverse, e.g., that God is wise and that he is good; but even adverse or opposed, e.g., that God is and is not wise; or that he is one and three. Abelard will speak variously of this adversity: dissonance (here), contrariety, controversy, etc. This is the most important aspect of these propositions: taken in pairs, they all have the form of contradictions or contraries (on this, more below).
Fifth and finally, that form is sensible, or their adversity is manifest to the senses. Notably, all throughout patristic writings, in the vast majority of cases the adversity will be only apparent; in certain cases, the adversity is actual or real. It does appear that all the cases which Abelard selects are only apparent and thus solvable contradictions (although Abelard will instruct in his prologue how to handle actual/real contradictions whereupon the father must be declared in error). Indeed, teaching someone how to solve apparent contradictions is a major part of Abelard’s overall project.
Abelard has of course carefully curated his collection of patristic authorities in line with his own goal–different from others’ goals (e.g., Lombard’s) and thus different from their collections, which thus do not e.g., highlight adversity between pairs of patristic sayings. In Abelard’s collection, the authorities are all manifestly adverse; and Abelard helps the reader by further manifesting this adversity to his senses (we might say by rubbing the reader’s nose in it)–accomplishing this by summarizing each set of propositions with a chapter title making it maximally explicit. And here we come to the logical character of his work.
Let us remind ourselves of some basics here. Scholastic chapter titles very frequently are logical propositions, and they often have one of two forms. The first form is a doubtable proposition (propositio dubitabilis), i.e., Boethus’s quaestio (question)--as e.g., throughout Thomas’s ST: Whether something is or is not (Utrum aliquid sit vel non sit); or and which is the sense, Whether the affirmative or negative part of this contradiction is true (Utrum sic vel non). The second form is a “plain” proposition–e.g., throughout Thomas’s SCG: That something is (Quod aliquid sit), or That something is not (Quod aliquid non sit)--viz., That the affirmative is true (Quod sic), or That the negative (Quod non).
However, as Aristotle reminds, there are in fact two sorts of opposition (or adversarialness). The first opposition is of contradiction, and of the form “that something is and is not” (est et non est; sic et non). The title forms just noted involved contradiction: the first form questions which of the parts is true, whereas the second proves one part as such. Yet there is a second sort of opposition, namely that of contrariness–having the form “that someone is something and its contrary” (est aliquid et contra). As a result of this, both the above title forms are often transposed to involve contrariness instead: thus, Whether such is something or its contrary (Utrum sit aliquid vel contra; e.g., Whether God is simple or composite); or That such is something (Quod sit aliquid; e.g., That God is simple, i.e., rather than composite).
Abelard follows developing scholastic practice and deploys logical propositions as his 158 chapter titles. However, these propositions are neither Boethian quaestiones, nor “plain” propositions (the above two forms). Instead, his titles have one of two other forms, depending upon the opposition involved (either contradiction or contrariness). The first form is the same as that of a contradiction: That something is and is not (Quod aliquid sit et non sit), e.g., That Socrates is and is not wise. And the second form is the same as that of two contraries: That someone is something and its contrary (Quod sit aliquid et contra), e.g., That Socrates is healthy and sick. Abelard’s first example of the former is his c 10, “That God is to be numbered among all…and [that he is] not.” His first nine chapters are all examples of the latter, namely involving contrariety: e.g., c 1, “That faith is to be supported by human arguments [rationes] and the contrary [=that it is to be supported by supernatural authorities].” Both forms Abelard generalizes as Quod sic et non, whence the work itself is titled, Sic et non. One could translate this title either, The Affirmative and Negative Both; or Both Contraries (depending upon whether contradiction or contrariness is in view); or perhaps just Both/And.
Abelard was a professional logician, and his students were fluent in all this (and much more). Although Abelard’s two forms for his chapter titles are the same as the forms of contradictions/contraries, the student knows perfectly well that he will find not actual contradictions/contraries, but just apparent ones. Speaking just to contradiction, the student knows that both parts of the apparent contradiction will be true; or speaking more properly, that both propositions appear to be the parts of one and the same contradiction (and thus one true one false), but are actually each the true part of a different (and actual) contradiction. “Yes and no,” means the affirmative of one contradiction is true, and the negative of another contradiction is also true–no matter how much it seems that the affirmative and negative are of the same contradiction.
Moreover, Abelard presents all this in the very clear context of teaching the student how to solve. Even identifying the appearance of contradiction is just Abelard assigning problems which he will teach how to solve, him giving “practice exercises” for learning methods of solution. In each chapter of his textbook, the student will be confronted with a practice exercise having the following standard form. He will be confronted with the appearance either of a contradiction, e.g., that God is and is not wise; or of two contraries, e.g., that God is wise and foolish. Various authorities from the fathers will align on either side of the “and” and thus, as they support each part, they also oppose each other. Although drawn together these authorities make one to say the fearsome et, Abelard wants the student, through repeated practice examples, to learn to say the et without fear, and indeed with knowledge.
Abelard’s text is therefore logical through and through. What has caused great remark among scholars who have painted Abelard as a radical, for Abelard (and any scholastic) is standard fair. Abelard again was a professional logician, certainly the strongest of his age; he was furthermore giving a textbook for students to learn to deploy the tools of logic for the ends of reconciling patristic authorities and achieving patristic knowledge and truth. Accusations of radicality, particularly ones grounded on what are standard logical forms, manifest that the accuser has simply not come to grips with the logical character of Abelard’s text.
Abelard, Sic et non (Boyer/McKeon), prologus (page 103–4). “His autem praelibatis placet, ut instituimus, diversa sanctorum patrum dicta colligere, quae nostrae occurrerint memoriae aliquam ex dissonantia quam habere videntur quaestionem contrahentia, quae teneros lectores ad maximum inquirendae veritatis exercitium provocent et acutiores ex inquisitione reddant. Haec quippe prima sapientiae clavis definitur assidua scilicet seu frequens interrogatio; ad quam quidem toto desiderio arripiendam philosophus ille omnium perspicacissimus Aristoteles in praedicamento Ad Aliquid studiosos adhortatur dicens, ‘Fortasse autem difficile est de huiusmodi rebus confidenter declarare nisi saepe pertractata sint. Dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile.’ Dubitando quippe ad inquisitionem venimus; inquirendo veritatem percipimus. Iuxta quod et Veritas ipsa Quaerite inquit et invenietis, pulsate et aperietur vobis. Quae nos etiam proprio exemplo moraliter instruens, circa duodecimum aetatis suae annum sedens et interrogans in medio doctorum inveniri voluit, primum discipuli nobis formam per interrogationem exhibens quam magistri per praedicationem, cum sit tamen ipsa Dei plena ac perfecta sapientia.”