William Lane Craig...Is Right about Thomist Simplicity?!

Yes.

Recently a short clip was dropped from William Lane Craig, apparently taken from a private meeting (we therefore lack further context). Here is the clip, and then a transcript from it—

“And it does seem to me that you’re right in saying that this Thomistic doctrine of divine simplicity contradicts more biblical teaching than does Arianism or Unitarianism or any of these other heresies, because at least Arianism or Unitarianism would admit that God could have a plurality of attributes and that God is not identical to his attributes or his existence [is not identical] with his essence. And so I think that you’re right, as odd as that sounds, that it’s more difficult to square the Thomistic doctrine of divine simplicity with the Bible than these other trinitarian or Christollogical heresies.”

Many defenders of (various accounts of) divine simplicity have been quite quick to disagree with Craig, or even lambast him as ridiculous. But I want to remind that actually what Craig says here is certainly correct, and that those who hold to e.g., Thomas’s doctrine of simplicity ought to frankly concede Craig’s point as true–and, now speaking very bluntly, need to man up and face the music when it comes to holy Scripture.

Indeed, this is a well-known historical challenge that was confronted perhaps most famously by Maimonides–who, together with Avicenna, form much of the backdrop of Thomas’s doctrine of simplicity. Maimonides faced a group called the Attributists, who read holy Scripture’s many propositions and thereby were moved to posit a plurality of attributes, e.g., power, wisdom, life, and goodness in God. Although the full story is complex, a couple quotations come immediately to mind, viz., Guide 1, 51, and then 1, 53 (I just use Pines’ translation):

“You must know that He, may He be exalted, has in no way and in no mode any essential attribute, and that just as it is impossible that He should be a body, it is also impossible that He should possess an essential attribute. If, however, someone believes that He is one, but possesses a certain number of essential attributes, he says in his words that He is one, but believes Him in his thought to be many. This resembles what the Christians say: namely, that he is one but also three, and that the three are one. Similar to this is the assertion of him who says that he is one but possesses many attributes and that He and His attributes are one, while he denies at the same time His being corporeal and believes in His absolute simplicity; as if what we aimed at and investigated were what we should say and not what we should believe….”

“The reasons that led those who believe in the existence of attributes belonging to the Creator to this belief are akin to those that led those who believe in the doctrine of His corporeality to that belief. For he who believes in this doctrine was not led to it by intellectual speculation; he merely followed the external sense of the texts of the Scriptures. This is also the case with regard to the attributes. For inasmuch as the books of the prophets and the revealed books existed, which predicate attributive qualifications of Him, may He be exalted, these were taken in their literal sense; and He was believed to possess attributes.”

Consider Maimonides’s point. When we read holy Scripture, it makes us to say many names of God, e.g., that he is wise, that he is good, etc. These names wise and good we usurp from our creaturely wisdom and goodness, and therefore we come to compose such of God in acts of intellectual judgment. Yet these latter acts are false judgments, and one can neither fix nor ignore that fact. Or I should say that they are false at least according to those who hold absolute divine simplicity, as does Maimonides and Thomas both (they are identical on all these points, of course), although Craig himself does not hold this–whereupon neither does Craig hold these judgments God being wise, being good, etc. as false.

Craig’s point is the same, although now making a comparison to Arianism and/or other heresies. On a sober analysis–which Craig says is rather strange to do/say, but still the case–there are much fewer and less overt propositions in holy Scripture which would make one to hold Arianism as true. By contrast, there are very many and very overt propositions in holy Scripture which make one to hold Thomist simplicity as false. “It’s more difficult,” Craig says, “to square the Thomistic doctrine of divine simplicity with the Bible than these other trinitarian or Christological heresies.” Both Maimonides and Thomas would freely admit this, and that is precisely why the doctrine includes the rather steep buy-in of reading so aggressively against the grain of the letters. This is a buy-in which Craig is unwilling to pay: for him, both Arianism and Thomist simplicity are false. For the Thomist, the former is false and the latter true. And as a result, the Thomist–just as Maimonides had to square up and admit–must radically reinterpret these scriptural propositions and take them allegorically.

Maimonides’s solution to this problem, including his radical reinterpretations, was twofold. First, it was to philosophically demonstrate that indeed God being simple is true, and that indeed these judgments God being wise, God being good, etc. are all false (both of which Thomas obviously agrees with, e.g., I Sent d 2 q 1 a 3 resp). This inoculates one with scientific certainty so that one can avoid reading the scriptural that God is wise, is good, etc. and holding (in fact) false judgments as true, true given what holy Scripture says. Second, it was to propose other but true judgments which could verify these same scriptural propositions, albeit entirely against what they say: these judgments are then the radical reinterpretations. Maimonides supplies two sorts of judgments: negative ones, and then those which ground analogy of proportionality.

On the former, these scriptural propositions that God is wise, is good, etc., are verified through the negative judgments that God is not foolish, that he is not evil, and so on. This entirely accords with absolute divine simplicity, as it merely divides these concepts from God and therefore is in line with God’s absolute oneness. This is called the negative interpretation, and it is used extremely frequently for problematic propositions, especially in sacred texts, throughout Jewish, Muslim, and Christian traditions.

On the latter, these scriptural propositions God being wise, being good, etc. are verified instead through affirmative judgments, but only those which compose certain (rational) relations to divine works, e.g., that God ordered the created universe, that he invested it with goodness, etc. These again agree with absolute divine simplicity, as such judgments merely compose (rational) relations to God ad extra, or rather real relations of others to God–as Thomas hastens to add, ST I q 13 a 2 resp. Such affirmative judgments can thereafter ground certain imaginations of God as a wise man, God as a good man, etc.; or they can ground analogies of proportionality: just as a wise man orders his affairs, so likewise God. Either of these (or actually both) can further justify and indeed verify scriptural propositions like God being wise, him being good, etc.

In conclusion, remarkably (seeing that Craig gets so much wrong about [Thomist] simplicity), this may be the one point where he’s actually right. Those who reject Craig’s point are likely mistaken about what Thomist simplicity includes (viz., how radical this doctrine is), and/or are not conscious of the radical reading (or, reinterpretation) program it requires vis-à-vis holy Scripture. You will be hard pressed to get Thomas’s doctrine from holy Scripture, and if you accept it–which you ought to, for good philosophical reasons–then you will be even more hard pressed to bend holy Scripture to fit its shape.