Holy Scripture starts with the doctrine of creation. That God exists before all. It is this radical distinction of God from all of his creatures that is so perfectly agreeable with divine simplicity. To be a creature is to be composed (or this part and that part, of matter and form, at least of essence and existence). God is not a creature, is not composed. The doctrine of creation in Genesis is followed up by the name of God in Exodus, identifying himself with his existence. Psalm 50 tells us he is not actually eating our sacrifices and guzzling them down, and Psalm 90 and 102 make his existence enduring and unchanging.
Unless you’re a blame materialist learning from Scripture that God flares his nostrils or gets up like violent drunk, I think divine simplicity is perfectly agreeable with the transcendence of God expressed in Scripture.
I generally agree with a number of these points, although it is one thing to say something is perfectly agreeable with God being simple, and another thing to say that holy Scripture generates that judgment from its letters in any kind of direct way. One important addition howver is that although one can be a blatant materialist, as you say, and (sillily) hold that God has nostrils, it is much less silly to hold that God has many attributes--although just as erroneous. And the scriptural support of the former is basically non-existent, although for the latter, quite existent.
I suppose it depends on what you mean by attributes too. If you simply mean predicates or something in our minds, then sure, God is good, is strong, is loving, is just. This agrees with Scripture and divine simplicity (and we see Thomas use these same predicates). The metaphysical claim that God’s attributes are not actually distinct from God himself is what simplicity asserts, and this doesn’t seem to be a concern of Scripture except inasmuch as his attributes are inseparable and unchanging (which Ps 136 repeats a good 26 times).
One more bit: I think the way Our Lord speaks in the Gospels lends itself to understanding God as simple. “I am the way, the truth, and the life.” He doesn’t just say he is true or is alive or a source of life, but he is the truth and he is the life. Same with “God is love”: not just loving, but he is his attribute.
What one means by attributes is, indeed, important :) Does one just mean concepts in the head, or does one mean "properties" (<--also a very equivocal term today) outside the head and "in" the thing. The Modistae called these modes :) Thomas will call them intentions; etc.
Some of the other comments have struck at this idea, but the thing that prevents me from fully agreeing with your concession to Craig (and also is a question raise by your article on mullins) is the idea that there is a “biblical teaching” purely derivable from ad litteram sense. Certainly it seems of my reading of Craig that he does believe the “Biblical teaching” to follow from the ad litteram sense, but I think this is on his part a failure to actually apprehend the full ad litteram sense which is by itself (ie in canonical context) in various places contradictory, contrary, or in tension with itself.
Craig says in another video I’ve seen, “the God of the philosophers is entirely foreign to the text of scripture” to which my response would not be “sure,” but rather “the God of one ad litteram text of Scripture is foreign to another ad litteram text of Scripture and the measuring rod by which we determine whether the ad litteram or some allegorical sense is right is therefore philosophy.”
The idea that there is a “biblical teaching” derivable purely from the ad litteram seems to me absurd, even though many have tried to do so.
Great point Noah. I think you definitely have your finger on a source of confusion for many.
I believe that the primary cause for the confusion is that you (and I would add others) are thinking more of the literal sense, whereas I am speaking of the ad litteram sense.
The former is, for lack of better terms, the ACTUAL sense of the words. Recall e.g., that Thomas will even say that when the letter is that God is a rock, the literal sense is not the figure (rock) but the figured, viz., that God supports. And under this sense, nothing can fall which is false.
The latter is more patristic, and is artificially contrived by the reader as (roughly) the sum total of the primary significations (roughly, original definitions) of the line of words in question. It is the surface reading, which is very often false--which is why the fathers will chastize those who understand secundum litteram.
There is much more to say here, but again roughly, the ad litteram sense is what appears on the page; the literal sense is the true judgments signified by the words. Again, I am speaking of the ad litteram sense: when you read holy Scripture, you do not and cannot get God being simple, and in fact you get the opposite--which is Craig's point. Of course, Craig (as anyone would) will also argue that the ad litteram sense in question is the actual sense, or (to speak more patristically) that one ought to understand secundum litteram, as the letters say.
Now all this is not to say that also in the ad litteram sense there are not "holes" (as one commenter above), inconsistencies, impossibilities, etc., which demand one to rise above (or dive below--pick your metaphor) to apprehend the meaning beneath the page. But that is a given, and doesn't undercut the fact that still the ad litteram sense as a whole induces people to certain conclusions about God or about reality which are false.
Or perhaps I should just simply say: both Craig and I come to the text with our respective philosophical positions in mind, and when it comes to what comes off the page (secundum litteram), *his position* is confirmed, not mine.
"Thomas would freely admit this, and that is precisely why the doctrine includes the rather steep buy-in of reading so aggressively against the grain of the letters"
I'm not sure that I agree that the Thomistic reading -- or the reading proper to any other variety of "classical theism" -- is against the grain of the letter. As you know, the letter describes God in terms that are patently metaphorical or superficially inconsistent, thus inviting synthetic and even metaphysical theological construction.
There are certainly "holes" in the ad litteram sense, as well as impossibilities, which one ought to argue (as you have, rightly) oblige "metaphysical theological construction."
But I would argue that my point still stands. The letters which are metaphorical, e.g., God being a rock, are vastly different from those of dispute, viz., God being love. This difference is an ad litteram difference, and despite the grounds IN the text to render a theological construction of ALL the sayings, the demand to do so is certainly different in the case of one than it is in the case of the other. Would you agree? Lookign forward to your pushback--
"Maimonides’s solution to this problem, including his radical reinterpretations, was twofold. First, it was to philosophically demonstrate that indeed God being simple is true, and that indeed these judgments God being wise, God being good, etc. are all false (both of which Thomas obviously agrees with, e.g., I Sent d 2 q 1 a 3 resp). "
But Aquinas doesn't necessarily agree with that, at least, not without some careful qualification. Aquinas explicitly disagrees with Maimonides on the issue of literally predicating certain perfections of God in ST 1.13.1, where he does affirm (contra explicitly Maimonides) that God is literally and substantially wise, good, etc. In that Sentences citation you made, Aquinas' point that the plurality of ratios/concepts that we apprehend cannot be purely on the side of the mind but also due to something on part of God Himself* would fail if God wasn't literally wise, good etc. Look carefully in the article where Maimonides and Avicenna are mentioned, because they are compared with Dionysius and Anselm. Thomas then reconciles the two views by saying that the former were simply denying any perfection that was in a mixed/participating/received (i.e., received into potency) mode of being in God, while the latter distinguished between a perfection being in a non-participating and participating mode. The former mode is fine to predicate of God, while the latter is not.
This is how even, elsewhere (ST 1.13.2), Aquinas interprets Dionysius preference to deny even seemingly pure perfections (perfections that, in their very definition, are indifferent to being received into potency, unlike something like vegetation or corporeality) as Dionysius only denying God of these perfections, again, only in a participating mode.
* This is what the Thomists will later call the distinction of reasoned reason that has its foundation in reality, that foundation being nothing other than the virtual distinction.
I will concede, however, that Scotus makes a very good argument on this. Consider again the distinction between the perfections in God acc. to Thomists. Qua the distinction being actual, what is being distinguished *are NOT* the divine perfections in themselves. The extremes of the distinction are not real beings, but beings of reasons (fictitious entities produced by the mind), and this distinction, due to being logical (even if it has a foundation in reality), is only in the mind and is the result of an imperfect mind. Now consider the distinction as not actual but.. virtual (virtual being being able to be manifested), qua virtual, there is an identity instead of a distinction. But the distinction, qua actual, was "formal" or between formalities (definitions), but if it's not actual but virtual, then there is a formal identity. What does this mean? It means that, outside of the limited mind, in God, there is an unlimited definition that is literally existing, living, understanding, powerful, *communicable* and *incommunicable*. Scotus' powerful argument is that the Trinity is destroyed because the difference between incommunicable personal property and communicable nature is purely a result of a mind trying to apprehend an infinite definition that is literally two opposing things but is really just one absolutely simple thing.
Now, esse, life and intelligence being the same unlimited definition in God isn't necessarily a problem, because as far as I am concerned, they are distinguished only by the privation of act. But God is purely actual, so no act can be privated. But the Thomists have no way to reconcile the Trinity with Thomas' view of simplicity without turning the virtual distinction into its opposite, a formal-actual distinction.
Holy Scripture starts with the doctrine of creation. That God exists before all. It is this radical distinction of God from all of his creatures that is so perfectly agreeable with divine simplicity. To be a creature is to be composed (or this part and that part, of matter and form, at least of essence and existence). God is not a creature, is not composed. The doctrine of creation in Genesis is followed up by the name of God in Exodus, identifying himself with his existence. Psalm 50 tells us he is not actually eating our sacrifices and guzzling them down, and Psalm 90 and 102 make his existence enduring and unchanging.
Unless you’re a blame materialist learning from Scripture that God flares his nostrils or gets up like violent drunk, I think divine simplicity is perfectly agreeable with the transcendence of God expressed in Scripture.
So no, I don’t think we have to hand this to him.
I generally agree with a number of these points, although it is one thing to say something is perfectly agreeable with God being simple, and another thing to say that holy Scripture generates that judgment from its letters in any kind of direct way. One important addition howver is that although one can be a blatant materialist, as you say, and (sillily) hold that God has nostrils, it is much less silly to hold that God has many attributes--although just as erroneous. And the scriptural support of the former is basically non-existent, although for the latter, quite existent.
Appreicate your thoughts, friend!
I suppose it depends on what you mean by attributes too. If you simply mean predicates or something in our minds, then sure, God is good, is strong, is loving, is just. This agrees with Scripture and divine simplicity (and we see Thomas use these same predicates). The metaphysical claim that God’s attributes are not actually distinct from God himself is what simplicity asserts, and this doesn’t seem to be a concern of Scripture except inasmuch as his attributes are inseparable and unchanging (which Ps 136 repeats a good 26 times).
One more bit: I think the way Our Lord speaks in the Gospels lends itself to understanding God as simple. “I am the way, the truth, and the life.” He doesn’t just say he is true or is alive or a source of life, but he is the truth and he is the life. Same with “God is love”: not just loving, but he is his attribute.
God bless you, my friend!
What one means by attributes is, indeed, important :) Does one just mean concepts in the head, or does one mean "properties" (<--also a very equivocal term today) outside the head and "in" the thing. The Modistae called these modes :) Thomas will call them intentions; etc.
Some of the other comments have struck at this idea, but the thing that prevents me from fully agreeing with your concession to Craig (and also is a question raise by your article on mullins) is the idea that there is a “biblical teaching” purely derivable from ad litteram sense. Certainly it seems of my reading of Craig that he does believe the “Biblical teaching” to follow from the ad litteram sense, but I think this is on his part a failure to actually apprehend the full ad litteram sense which is by itself (ie in canonical context) in various places contradictory, contrary, or in tension with itself.
Craig says in another video I’ve seen, “the God of the philosophers is entirely foreign to the text of scripture” to which my response would not be “sure,” but rather “the God of one ad litteram text of Scripture is foreign to another ad litteram text of Scripture and the measuring rod by which we determine whether the ad litteram or some allegorical sense is right is therefore philosophy.”
The idea that there is a “biblical teaching” derivable purely from the ad litteram seems to me absurd, even though many have tried to do so.
Curious what you think about my approach!
Great point Noah. I think you definitely have your finger on a source of confusion for many.
I believe that the primary cause for the confusion is that you (and I would add others) are thinking more of the literal sense, whereas I am speaking of the ad litteram sense.
The former is, for lack of better terms, the ACTUAL sense of the words. Recall e.g., that Thomas will even say that when the letter is that God is a rock, the literal sense is not the figure (rock) but the figured, viz., that God supports. And under this sense, nothing can fall which is false.
The latter is more patristic, and is artificially contrived by the reader as (roughly) the sum total of the primary significations (roughly, original definitions) of the line of words in question. It is the surface reading, which is very often false--which is why the fathers will chastize those who understand secundum litteram.
There is much more to say here, but again roughly, the ad litteram sense is what appears on the page; the literal sense is the true judgments signified by the words. Again, I am speaking of the ad litteram sense: when you read holy Scripture, you do not and cannot get God being simple, and in fact you get the opposite--which is Craig's point. Of course, Craig (as anyone would) will also argue that the ad litteram sense in question is the actual sense, or (to speak more patristically) that one ought to understand secundum litteram, as the letters say.
Now all this is not to say that also in the ad litteram sense there are not "holes" (as one commenter above), inconsistencies, impossibilities, etc., which demand one to rise above (or dive below--pick your metaphor) to apprehend the meaning beneath the page. But that is a given, and doesn't undercut the fact that still the ad litteram sense as a whole induces people to certain conclusions about God or about reality which are false.
Thoughts?
Or perhaps I should just simply say: both Craig and I come to the text with our respective philosophical positions in mind, and when it comes to what comes off the page (secundum litteram), *his position* is confirmed, not mine.
"Thomas would freely admit this, and that is precisely why the doctrine includes the rather steep buy-in of reading so aggressively against the grain of the letters"
I'm not sure that I agree that the Thomistic reading -- or the reading proper to any other variety of "classical theism" -- is against the grain of the letter. As you know, the letter describes God in terms that are patently metaphorical or superficially inconsistent, thus inviting synthetic and even metaphysical theological construction.
There are certainly "holes" in the ad litteram sense, as well as impossibilities, which one ought to argue (as you have, rightly) oblige "metaphysical theological construction."
But I would argue that my point still stands. The letters which are metaphorical, e.g., God being a rock, are vastly different from those of dispute, viz., God being love. This difference is an ad litteram difference, and despite the grounds IN the text to render a theological construction of ALL the sayings, the demand to do so is certainly different in the case of one than it is in the case of the other. Would you agree? Lookign forward to your pushback--
Ryan, are those Biblical statements false - or are they metaphorical? Are those different?
You said this:
"Maimonides’s solution to this problem, including his radical reinterpretations, was twofold. First, it was to philosophically demonstrate that indeed God being simple is true, and that indeed these judgments God being wise, God being good, etc. are all false (both of which Thomas obviously agrees with, e.g., I Sent d 2 q 1 a 3 resp). "
But Aquinas doesn't necessarily agree with that, at least, not without some careful qualification. Aquinas explicitly disagrees with Maimonides on the issue of literally predicating certain perfections of God in ST 1.13.1, where he does affirm (contra explicitly Maimonides) that God is literally and substantially wise, good, etc. In that Sentences citation you made, Aquinas' point that the plurality of ratios/concepts that we apprehend cannot be purely on the side of the mind but also due to something on part of God Himself* would fail if God wasn't literally wise, good etc. Look carefully in the article where Maimonides and Avicenna are mentioned, because they are compared with Dionysius and Anselm. Thomas then reconciles the two views by saying that the former were simply denying any perfection that was in a mixed/participating/received (i.e., received into potency) mode of being in God, while the latter distinguished between a perfection being in a non-participating and participating mode. The former mode is fine to predicate of God, while the latter is not.
This is how even, elsewhere (ST 1.13.2), Aquinas interprets Dionysius preference to deny even seemingly pure perfections (perfections that, in their very definition, are indifferent to being received into potency, unlike something like vegetation or corporeality) as Dionysius only denying God of these perfections, again, only in a participating mode.
* This is what the Thomists will later call the distinction of reasoned reason that has its foundation in reality, that foundation being nothing other than the virtual distinction.
I will concede, however, that Scotus makes a very good argument on this. Consider again the distinction between the perfections in God acc. to Thomists. Qua the distinction being actual, what is being distinguished *are NOT* the divine perfections in themselves. The extremes of the distinction are not real beings, but beings of reasons (fictitious entities produced by the mind), and this distinction, due to being logical (even if it has a foundation in reality), is only in the mind and is the result of an imperfect mind. Now consider the distinction as not actual but.. virtual (virtual being being able to be manifested), qua virtual, there is an identity instead of a distinction. But the distinction, qua actual, was "formal" or between formalities (definitions), but if it's not actual but virtual, then there is a formal identity. What does this mean? It means that, outside of the limited mind, in God, there is an unlimited definition that is literally existing, living, understanding, powerful, *communicable* and *incommunicable*. Scotus' powerful argument is that the Trinity is destroyed because the difference between incommunicable personal property and communicable nature is purely a result of a mind trying to apprehend an infinite definition that is literally two opposing things but is really just one absolutely simple thing.
Now, esse, life and intelligence being the same unlimited definition in God isn't necessarily a problem, because as far as I am concerned, they are distinguished only by the privation of act. But God is purely actual, so no act can be privated. But the Thomists have no way to reconcile the Trinity with Thomas' view of simplicity without turning the virtual distinction into its opposite, a formal-actual distinction.