The Literal Sense in Holy Scripture: Intro from Thomas Aquinas
Literally?!
In our first post in this series (Senses of Holy Scripture: A Basic Intro from Thomas), we introduced the basic distinction between the literal and spiritual senses, which form the two genera or overarching categories fo all the various and sundry senses found in holy Scripture. This is the first distinction to make, and it is both extremely important, and often confused.
As we saw, literal and spiritual senses are distinguished according to what signifier the sense is being taken from. For literal sense, as the name insinuates, the sense is taken from signification found in letters or words. We thus call it literal (or letteral) sense–which has nothing to do with whether e.g., there is metaphor involved or no (note that in colloquial English, literal means roughly the same as non-metaphorical).
Spiritual sense, by contrast, is taken from signification found not in letters/words, but in realities. Although this is often mistaken especially in Protestant tradition, God before and outside holy Scripture made certain realities to be signs–realities such as the various and sundry ones involving the nation of Israel, whether historical events (e.g., the Red Sea Crossing), or ceremonial (e.g., the sacrificial lamb), or something else. These signs thus have sense or (roughly) meaning, altogether independent of any human intellect (e.g., the authors of holy Scripture); and they have this before and besides their eventual enclosure in holy Scripture as the sense or meaning of now the letters. Still, by virtue of these signification realities being themselves later signified by the letters of holy Scripture, the letters themselves are said to have spiritual sense, in addition to their own literal sense.
Thus we say that there are two senses (generically speaking) in holy Scripture, not just one.
This distinction again is important, and was covered in our last post. Here, we want to focus only on the literal sense, and advance its two species according to Thomas Aquinas: these species have many names, but we can call them proper and improper (or metaphorical) respectively.
As before, we are following Thomas’s Galatians commentary, specifically the following quotation:
There are two significations: one is through words, and the other is through realities which the words signify. This occurs not in other writings, but uniquely in holy Scripture, seeing that its author is God—God, in whose power it is to employ not just words for designating something (which even a man can do), but even realities themselves. Accordingly, in other sciences delivered by men, only words signify, as not except words can be employed for signifying; but unique to this [divine] science is that both words and realities themselves, which were signified through the words, signify something. Thus this science can have many senses–for that signification how words signify something, pertains to the literal (or historical) sense; whereas that signification how realities (signified by words) signify still other realities, pertains to the mystical sense.
Now on the one hand, something can be signified through the literal sense in two ways: namely, according to the propriety of some locution–as when I say that a man laughs; or according to a similitude/metaphor, as when I say that a field laughs. And holy Scripture uses both, as when we say that Jesus ascends (regarding the first mode), versus when we say that he sits at the right hand of God (regarding the second). Accordingly, under the literal sense is included the parabolic or metaphorical sense.
But on the other hand, the mystical (or spiritual) sense is divided into three. This is because, first, the old law is a figure of the new law–as the apostle says. Thus, insofar as those realities which are of the old law signify these realities which are of the new, we find the allegorical sense. Second, according to Dionysius (in his work, On Celestial Hierarchies), the new law is a figure of future glory. Thus, insofar as these realities which are in the new law and in Christ signify those realities which are in the fatherland, we find the anagogical sense. Third, also in the new law, those which are done in the head [namely, Christ], are examples of these which we ought to do, as whatsoever were written, were written for our learning. Thus, insofar as those realities which in the new law have been done either in Christ or in those [realities] which signify Christ are signs of these which we ought to do, we find the moral sense.
An example can clarify all these senses. Through the fact that I say let there be light ad litteram of bodily light, its sense reduces to the literal sense. But if this let there be light is understood i.e., let Christ be born in the church, then its sense reduces to the allegorical. Whereas if I said let there be light i.e., through Christ we are introduced to glory, then its sense reduces to the anagogical. But finally, if is said let there be light i.e., through Christ we are illumined in mind and inflamed in heart, then its sense reduces to the moral.
The second paragraph is relevant for us here. In it, Thomas speaks firstly of how it is in the natural order or “normal” human texts, versus how in holy Scripture.
Normal Human Texts: Proper and Improper Senses
Regarding the former, Thomas cites an example which was popular in his day among grammarians and expropriated by logicians: saying that a man laughs (homo ridet), versus saying that a field laughs (pratum ridet). The example feels strange to us today, but it is an exceptionally good one given that risibility (ability to laugh) is the traditional proprium i.e., unique feature of a man which distinguishes him from all others, angels and e.g., other animals included. And as we know for certain given our sense experience, in reality the act laughing can only ever be found in an individual of a rational nature (i.e., a man)--no matter what we say otherwise! Even if we say (and truly) that a field laughs, we know that the act laughing cannot be found in a field, given its different nature from that of a man. This is why the example is a good one, and was so abundantly used.
Continuing, when I say that a man e.g., Socrates laughs, the name or predicate signifies the concept laughing which I am affirming of Socrates in my intellectual act of judgment (here, composition). This judgment (say) is true, and the predicate thus ultimately reflects real laughing in Socrates. Accordingly, the saying returns proper (literal) sense, in that the name/predicate laughs signifies that concept, and that concept is being truly composed to that individual subject. Indeed, saying something proprie, properly, and something being a proprium, a unique feature are importantly connected in the scholastic mind: in that real laughing is a proprium of a man, saying its name of a man is proper locution or saying such properly.
But we can also usurp the same name laughs and say it truly of other subjects who do not have human nature. This pulls ultimately from real laughing in a man, but proximately from our concept laughing. But in the case of non-human subjects, although we can truly utter the proposition e.g., that the field laughs, in order for such a proposition to be true, it must signify a different intellectual judgment composing a different concept than our concept laughing. When I say that a field laughs, the name or predicate laughs signifies not the act laughing, but the act blooming: I am “saying” in my head the judgment composing the act blooming (ultimately reflecting the real act blooming in the field), although uttering with my mouth the proposition which “composes” the act laughing. That the field laughs, in other words, was just a metaphor for (my judgment, and by extension the reality) that it blooms.
Two further remarks. First, this metaphor is not in use in English/our contemporary world, and thus it is opaque: this by my estimation makes it an even better example than its use in scholastics, for whom the metaphor was similar to our saying “he has a green thumb” (or for our British friends, “green fingers”). It forces us to think not in terms of meaning of words, but acts of understanding (concepts) and judgments in the head–which is what scholastics mean by sense anyway.
Second, the metaphor that a field laughs is intellectually justified or fitting, given the fact that just as laughing is the natural overflow of what man is, just so flowering is the natural overflow of what a field or meadow is. The latter statement is analogy of proportionality, which for Thomas both is a metaphor-making machine (we devise metaphors most frequently as a consequence of our intellectual act comparing or “doing” analogy), and also is the strongest explanation of fittingness (ratio convenientiae) of any metaphor. This is why he speaks of “according to similitude” in the quotation noted above: by similitude, he does not mean the straightforward similarity between a man and a field, but the proportional similarity between each and their respective “natural overflows” (laughing and blooming respectively).
These then are the very basics of signification, and the traditional understanding of metaphor (for more on metaphor, see Metaphor, The Essential Guide). Most importantly for our current purposes, the sense (or judgment) taken from the saying that a man laughs, is proper; whereas the sense taken from the saying that a field laughs, is improper/metaphorical. (Both senses reduce to the literal, as distinguished from the spiritual, given that both are taken from signifying words!) Both sayings return true judgments, but one by way of proper and the other by way of metaphorical locution. Saying that a man laughs adverts to the judgment that he laughs; but saying that a field laughs, that it blooms.
Note that the “fact” of proper versus metaphorical sense is not betrayed by any difference in grammatical structure–something many people today confuse. A man laughs and a field laughs look identical.
We know only that the latter returns improper/metaphorical sense, given that we are certain that real laughing cannot fall in a field.
Supposing that someone did not know by experience what a field was, he would need to have philosophically demonstrated to him that laughing cannot fall in a field–whereupon and only whereupon he would know that the true proposition that a field laughs cannot be intended properly, but must be a metaphor for e.g., that a field blooms. This, for the record, is the basic reason why we must use philosophy to read holy Scripture: we do not know what God is, and therefore must demonstrate what can and cannot fall in him, in order to determine what in holy Scripture can be intended properly, and what must be just a metaphor. This is rendered the more necessary, given the fact that the majority of sayings in holy Scripture are various sorts of metaphor.
Holy Scripture: Proper and Improper Senses
Indeed, this brings us to holy Scripture and the same sort of things as just noted in “normal” human texts: some sayings return proper sense, some improper/metaphorical. For example, when I read that God knows, then this yields proper literal sense; when I read that he sees, then this yields improper. When I read that he is angered, this too is improper; and when I read that he is love, this is proper. We determine all this philosophically, given what can and cannot truly be in God–just like we determine (if necessary, philosophically) what can and cannot truly be in a field. This of course is why the path to apprehending the sense of holy Scripture–or the true judgments from the letters–is often very long and very difficult.
Thomas himself uses a different example in the above quotation–an example borrowed from the Apostles’ Creed: when is written that the Son ascends, versus when is written that he sits at the right hand of God. This example is exceptionally good, because it alerts to how difficult it can be to determine whether (and why) the resultant sense is proper, versus metaphorical. Let us walk through this.
Once again, both sayings (or writings) appear identical, grammatically speaking. Speaking as many would today, the meaning of both is equally transparent and to that extent of the same sort. But speaking of the sense in either, the respective true judgments signified by these sayings, they are proper and improper respectively.
That the Son ascends returns proper (literal) sense, because the act ascending can (and does) fall in him according to human nature. The name/predicate signifies the concept ascending, which is being composed and truly of him, and which reflects the reality or the fact that Christ really is ascending (as we would say colloquially today).
That the Son sits, however, cannot return proper sense. One might immediately ask Why not, given that the act sitting can fall in Christ also according to human nature, and indeed many other “that Christ sits” sayings in holy Scripture are proper (e.g., he sat at the passover table). Therefore, it seems that this can be proper sense.
Such is true, if one only considers part of the predicate at hand, namely the concept sitting. However, the entire predicate of the saying includes other concepts, as reflected in the rest of the saying, viz., that Christ sits at the right hand of God.
And as we know (philosophically, but also common sensically), God does not have a hand.
This saying therefore is the same as saying that a field laughs. It is a metaphor for e.g., that Christ is honored by all the nations; or rules over all peoples; or something of this sort.
Two final, concluding notes. First, what we have called here the improper or metaphorical (literal) sense, also called such by Thomas, in tradition is often called the allegorical sense (although the spiritual sense is also called the allegorical–and besides this, other senses are called allegorical). It is also called the parabolic–although sometimes only the certain literal sense unique to e.g., Christ’s parables in the Gospels is called such.
Second, there are found throughout holy Scripture many other literal senses, i.e., senses which reduce to the genus the literal by contrast to the genus spiritual. For example, there is the historical, the etiological, the analogical (cf ST I q 1 a 10 ad 2)--we can speak of these another time. The two species proper and improper are designed to adequately enclose all of these further subcategories, and thus adequately divide up the entirety of the literal sense.